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Abstract—For distributed machine learning with sensitive data,
we demonstrate how minimizing distance correlation between
raw data and intermediary representations reduces leakage of
sensitive raw data patterns across client communications while
maintaining model accuracy. Leakage (measured using distance
correlation between input and intermediate representations) is
the risk associated with the invertibility of raw data from
intermediary representations. This can prevent client entities
that hold sensitive data from using distributed deep learning
services. We demonstrate that our method is resilient to such
reconstruction attacks and is based on reduction of distance
correlation between raw data and learned representations during
training and inference with image datasets. We prevent such re-
construction of raw data while maintaining information required
to sustain good classification accuracies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data sharing and distributed computation with security,
privacy and safety have been identified amongst important
current trends in application of data mining and machine
learning to healthcare, computer vision, cyber-security, inter-
net of things, distributed systems, data fusion and finance.
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Hosting of siloed data by multiple
client (device or organizational) entities that do not trust each
other due to sensitivity and privacy issues poses to be a barrier
for distributed machine learning. This paper proposes a way to
mitigate the reconstruction of raw data in such distributed ma-
chine learning settings from culpable attackers. Our approach
is based on minimizing a statistical dependency measure called
distance correlation [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] between raw data and
any intermediary communications across the clients or server
participating in distributed deep learning. We also ensure our
learnt representations help maintain reasonable classification
accuracies of the model, thereby making the model useful
while also protecting raw sensitive data from reconstruction
by an attacker that can be situated in any of the untrusted
clients participating in distributed machine learning.
Reconstruction attack setting: The proposed solution aims
to give greater protection to the distributed learning ecosystem
from reconstruction attacks (reconstruction of raw data from
transformed activations) from attackers residing in any client
or server that receives communications from another client.
It also protects reconstruction attacks from insider threats
(attacker resides inside the client/server that transforms the
sensitive data). The attack is also illustrated in Figure 1
with regards to the regular training of deep neural networks.
We now describe the popular reconstruction attack setting in
greater detail along with its relevance to current real-world
distributed deep learning prospects.
Attack assumptions: We consider providing security in
relatively worst-case settings where the attacker is given an ad-
vantage in terms of the assumptions made. This is considered
to be a good practice in the community of privacy preserving
machine learning as it also enables provision of security under
a wider variety of plausible modifications of attack schemes
with assumptions that are weaker than the assumed worst-
case attacker’s capacities. This level of protection is thereby
expected to be offered by a working solution in addition to its
value in the worst-case setting assumed. In worst-case recon-
struction attack settings, the attacker has access to a leaked
subset of samples of training data along with corresponding
transformed activations at a chosen layer, the outputs of which
are always exposed to other clients/server by design for the
distributed training of the deep learning network to be possible.
The attacker could reside in any untrusted client or server that
is part of the distributed training setup. The attacker also has
access to rest of the activations corresponding to unleaked
training data at the same layer. This is also by design, in
order for the distributed training to be functionally possible.
The attacker tries to learn an image to image translation
model from the transformed activations to the leaked raw
data. The attacker can then use that model to reconstruct raw
data from activations corresponding to unleaked training data
or unleaked test/validation data by inferring from the learnt
reconstruction model that was trained on corresponding pairs
of activations and raw samples of leaked data.
Attack implications: Typically leakage of a sub-sample
of raw data has serious financial, ethical, legal, public re-
lation (PR) and regulatory implications. Such leakages have
continued to happen in recent times and often the ratio
of # of records leakedtotal # of records owned by the institution is quite small and yet the
real-life negative implications of such a leak are massive.
According to ‘2019 Cost of a Data Breach Report’ in [15],
the cost per data breach is between $1.25 million to $8.19
million depending on country and industry at which the breach
occurs. The average size of a data breach is established to be
around 25, 575 records. The total global cost of data breaches
runs into billions of dollars per year. In addition 60% of
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that experience a cyber
breach go out of business in the following 6 months according
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to an official government report in [16]. The lifecycle of
a typical data breach is estimated to be 279 days and for
that of a malicious attack is estimated to be 314 days. The
goal henceforth is to prevent the attacker from using the
leaked data to construct an inverse model that can reconstruct
other raw data records upon just looking at the communicated
intermediate activations received at the server as is required by
the important distributed deep learning settings cited above.
Relevance of attack setting: We describe two popular
settings of distributed deep learning where this attack setting
is highly relevant.
1) Split Learning: This attack model is highly relevant to
a popular resource and communication efficient variant
of distributed deep learning called split learning [17,
18, 19]. In this setting, intermediate activations from a
chosen layer (called split leayer) of the deep network are
communicated from client to the server during training.
The rest of the network is processed at the server during
forward propagation. In turn, during backpropagation
the gradients from the server’s first layer (layer next
to the split layer) are communicated back to the client.
The rest of backpropagation occurs at the client. These
rounds of communication are continued to finish all
the epochs of distributed training. Split learning has
also been ported into PySyft by OpenMined, a popular
and widely adopted opensource framework for privacy
preserving distributed machine learning. Split learning
has been adopted in Internet of Things (IOT) and edge-
device machine learning settings in [20, 21, 22, 23]
including multi-modal fusion based machine learning
across edge devices in [24, 25] with data collected at the
edge on imagery and millimeter wave (mmWave) radio
frequency (RF) signals to perform distributed machine
learning. Split learning has also been used for Ultra Re-
liable Low Latency Communication (URLLC) settings
with distributed learning as part of 5G communication
research. Suitability of split learning for healthcare has
been described in [26]. The work in [27] considers
protection of intermediate activations under this attack
setting solely for private inference via learning of spe-
cific noise distributions to perturb the activations prior to
communication. Our work instead focuses on training.
2) Adversarial reconstruction: This threat model has also
been considered with regards to adversarial reconstruc-
tion attack settings such as those considered in [28]
based on activations obtained at the end of neural net-
work. Server-side insider threats that aim to reconstruct
raw data of the client are another realistic example of
this attack setting. [29] attempts to learn activations
of a given network at chosen layers while attempting
to protect an adversarial reconstructor that attempts to
reconstruct entire raw data or partial attributes of raw
data from these activations.
The attack settings outside the purview of reconstruction
attacks that we do not consider in this paper include those of
Fig. 1: Left: In the regime of regular training of deep neural
networks, information about sensitive raw input data is leaked
through intermediate activations even after input data passes
through multiple layers. As shown in this figure, upon sending
intermediate activations from a trusted network on a client
to an untrusted network for computing rest of the task, an
adversary on server-side can reconstruct original raw data from
the activations. Right: NoPeek is a method where intermediate
activations are decorrelated with raw input data while training
the network to obtain high classification accuracy on the
untrusted network. In this figure, unlike regular deep neural
network training, the adversary is not able to reconstruct the
exact raw image of the person.
model extraction, model inversion, malicious training, adver-
sarial examples (evasion attacks) and membership inference.
A. Contributions
We show that reducing the distance correlation between
learned representations and raw data prevents information
leakage with regards to sensitive data in machine learning
settings. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The decorrelated data
can then be used for various machine learning tasks as long as
it holds enough information to perform the intended task while
not having enough information to reconstruct the raw data
itself. Our developed methods apply to the following settings:
1) Training schemes to prevent reconstruction of entire raw
data or specifically chosen attributes in deep learning
during inference.
2) Device-level sanitization as burn-in period to reduce
leakage of information during the initial epochs of
training while not requiring the client that holds the
raw data to communicate with the server. Following this
burn-in period, the client and server entities train with
communication between them.
We evaluate the method and share detailed results via a
reconstruction testbed we describe in the experiments section.
B. Code/Reproducibility
The code for our method is provided in this anony-
mous code repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/
820473f8-f3ee-4212-9b9c-409a78722af6/. We will also re-
lease seeds, trained models, training logs, and intermediate
data files for improving reproducability.
II. RELATED WORK
We primarily focus on the modality of image/computer
vision datasets to analyze and test our proposed method. To
maintain specificity we broadly categorized related works on
security and privacy for this modality as follows.
a) Deep learning, adversarial learning and information
theoretic loss based privacy: These can be categorized into
hiding specific sensitive attributes using adversarial training
that reaches an equilibrium based on information theoretic loss
functions optimized under minimax settings through learning
weights of deep learning models [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35].
A kernelized version of such an adversarial learning approach
with theoretical guarantees is provided in [36]. A similar non-
adversarial approach that still uses a dependency measure of
maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) for learning a variational
autoencoder is in [37, 38]. The method we propose in our
paper is not necessarily tied to a generative adversarial network
(GAN) styled architecture where two separate models have
to be trained in tandem. Our proposed model is based on
a easily implementable differentiable loss function between
the intermediate activations and the raw data. This will be
described in detail later on in section III.
b) Homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party com-
putation for computer vision:: Homomorphic encryption (HE)
and multi-party computation (MPC) techniqes although highly
secure are not computationally scalable and communication
efficient for complex tasks like training large deep learning
models. Thereby their application to machine learning has
been with regards to smaller computations or specific ap-
plications requiring computation of functions with a much
simpler complexity. The work in [39, 40, 41] describes HE
and garbled circuits (an MPC scheme) for privacy-preserving
biometric identification. Similarly [42, 43] uses MPC schemes
like oblivious transfer, secure millionaire, secure dot product
for face matching with respect to a collection of sensitive
surveillance footage images. [44] uses HE for secure aggrea-
gation of classifiers in a distributed learning setting where
different entities train models on their local data and share
the model weights or model related information that needs to
be securely aggregated at a centralized entity. Our proposed
method in this paper is communication efficient and highly
scalable computationally with regards to large deep learning
architectures for both training as well as inference attacks
unlike the HE and MPC based models.
c) Differential privacy for computer vision:: Differential
privacy schemes are based on adding noise dependent on the
query under computation to primarily provide privacy against
membership inference attacks. The works in [45, 46, 47]
are examples of such schemes for transfer learning, subspace
clustering. A modified scheme called separated-DP [48] aims
to provide guarantees against reconstruction in the context
of federated learning [49], a popular distributed learning
method for the purpose of protecting model weights trained
at individual client entities while securely aggregating the
average of these weights at a centralized server. These methods
typically take a stronger hit on accuracy of deep learning
models although at the benefit of attempting to provide worst-
case privacy guarantees for membership inference attacks.
III. METHOD
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Fig. 2: Workflow for NoPeek method including a) device-
level santization on the client during a burn-in period (in red)
followed by b) training with the NoPeek method (in green) to
prevent reconstruction of data while maintaining classifcation
accuracies. There is no communication between client (left)
and server (right) during the burning period until the device-
level sanitization is completed.
Key idea: The key idea of our proposed method is to reduce
information leakage by adding an additional loss term to the
commonly used classification loss term of categorical cross-
entropy. The information leakage reduction loss term we use
is distance correlation; a powerful measure of non-linear (and
linear) statistical dependence between random variables. The
distance correlation loss is minimized between raw input data
and the output of any particularly chosen layer whose outputs
need to be communicated from the client to another untrusted
client or untrusted server. Optimization of this combination
of two losses helps ensure the activations resulting from the
protected layer have minimal information with regards to
reconstructing the raw data while still being useful enough
to achieve reasonable classification accuracies upon post-
processing of these activations. The quality of preventing
reconstruction of raw input data while maintaining reasonable
Fig. 3: Universal decorrelation iterations show reduction in
distance correlation with raw data (orange) while preserving
distance correlation needed to complete the task (blue) on
CIFAR-10 data. This scheme is useful to reduce leakage as
burn-in period prior to starting distributed deep learning as this
does not require any communication with the outside network.
This scheme is not required during inference any more as
decorrelator is trained by then. We observe in our experiments
that this is crucial in preventing reconstruction during initial
epochs of distributed training post the burn-in period.
classification accuracies is qualitatively and quantitatively sub-
stantiated in the experiments section. Therefore, layers from
the raw data upto the protected layer act as decorrelation layers
that preserve classification utility.
Loss function: The total loss function for n samples of
input data X, activations from protected layer Z, true labels
Ytrue, predicted labels Y and scalar weights α1, α2 is there-
fore given by
α1DCOR(X,Z) + α2CCE(Ytrue,Y) (1)
The gradient of distance correlation is provided be-
low for optimization purposes in Appendix A although
we optimize the above loss function using Autograd as
we use it in the context of distributed deep learning. A
deep learning friendly code for computing distance corre-
lation is also provided there. A link to our anonymous
code repository is also provided there for reproducibility.
Fig. 4: Universal decorre-
lation iterations show re-
duction in distance corre-
lation with raw data (blue)
while preserving distance
correlation needed to com-
plete the task (green) on
Boston Housing data. This
scheme is useful to reduce
leakage as burn-in period
prior to starting distributed
deep learning as this does
not require any communi-
cation with the outside net-
work.
A. Initialization with device-
level decorrelation
All iterations of training re-
quire communication between
the client/server entities involved
in distributed deep learning. In
order to ensure that there is no
leakage during the initial iter-
ations of minimizing our pro-
posed loss function, we perform
a device-level decorrelation rou-
tine during an initial burn-in pe-
riod of iterations before allowing
any communication. Therefore
this is a highly communication-
efficient approach for learning
decorrelated representations of
client’s raw data that can then
be shared with other entities in a
distributed learning setting. Fol-
lowing the burn-in period, the
server receives the decorrelated
activations and continues to sync with the client to perform
distributed training of our loss function proposed in previous
subsection. This process is illustrated at a high-level in Figures
2, 3, 4 and 5.
Unlike traditional distributed deep learning approaches, this
iterative approach does not require any gradient backprop-
agation or exchange of activations with outside network to
perform the optimization and is particularly suitable for on-
device (client) decorrelation of data prior to performing any
major communications across the distributed entities. This
scheme is useful to reduce leakage as burn-in period prior
to starting distributed deep learning as it does not require any
communication with the outside network. Following this after
the distributed deep learning based decorrelator is trained, this
Fig. 5: The device level sanitization scheme helps to control
leakage during early iterations of model training by acting
as a burn-in period to initialize the activations for the deep
learning based decorrelator. Following this the distributed deep
learning model is trained. During inference, the distributed
deep learning model is used directly as the model remains
trained at that point of time.
scheme is not required during inference any more as decorrela-
tor is trained to be optimal by that point of time. This approach
of solely optimizing on client to initialize the distributed deep
learning model with a decorrelated representation prior to
beginning model training as illustrated in Figure 5.
The idea is based on a modification of a scheme for maxi-
mizing sum of distance correlations proposed in [50] to obtain
low-dimensional representations that preserve a high distance
correlation with labels Y. Motivated by their setup which
also seems similar in principle to the information bottleneck
method, we instead consider a difference of these distance
correlations instead of a sum as unlike their method which
was for supervised dimensionality reduction we would like to
minimize distance correlation with raw data while preserving
distance correlation with labels. This objective function can be
expressed as below as distance correlation can be expressed
in terms of specific graph Laplacians whose exact form is
detailed in [50]:
f(Z) =
TrZTLyZ√
TrYTLYYTrZTLZZ
− TrZ
TLXZ√
TrXTLXXTrZTLZZ
The iterative update for maximization of the above objective
is based on a variant of majorization-minimization [51, 52] and
is given by Zt = HZt−1 where
H =
(
γ2DX − αSX,Y
)†
(γ2DX − LM)
for a fixed γ2, some α and where kX = 1√
TrXTLXX
, kY =
1√
TrYTLYY
are constants, and SX,y = kY LY − βkXLX for
a tuning parameter β, where the details of all these parameters
are also in [50] except for β which has been added to study its
effect on convergence rate as seen in Figure 2. The only other
difference in the iterative updates ends up in the definition
of SXY where in the case of the supervised dimensionality
reduction usecase, the negative instead becomes a positive.
B. Advantages of using distance correlation
Estimation of classical information theoretic-measures as
used in [30, 31, 32, 33, 34] is a known hard problem. Recent
approaches to estimate it effectively like [53] are based on
iterative optimization. A recent data efficient version of it
requires 3 nested for loops of optimization [54] to estimate it.
Therefore in the context of deep learning, every epoch of learn-
ing the weights is dependent on this iterative optimization.
In contrast our approach uses distance correlation, a measure
of non-linear (and linear) dependency that can be estimated
in closed-form. Fast estimators of distance correlation require
O(nlogn) [55, 56] computational complexity for univariate
and O(nKlogn) complexity [57] for multivariate settings with
O(max(n,K)) memory requirement, where K is the number
of random projections. Distance correlation has been shown to
be a simpler special case of other recent popular measures of
dependence such as Hilbert-Schmidt Independence Criterion
(HSIC), Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) and Kernelized
Mutual Information (KMI) that have been extensively stud-
ied and used recently in the machine learning and statistics
community [11, 58, 59, 60]. An advantage of using a simpler
alternative is that in addition to it being differentiable and
easily computable with a closed-form, it requires no other
tuning of parameters and is self-contained unlike HSIC, MMD
and KMI that depend on a choice of separate kernels for
features as well as labels along with their respective tuning
parameters.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Reconstruction attack testbed: We empirically examine
the privacy aspects of our method by designing a testbed
which performs feature inversion. The idea of this testbed
is to emulate the attacker and to evaluate the quality of
reconstruction attack. The testbed itself is a neural network
with a decoder architecture where the layers are composed
of transpose convolutions. Similar architecture have been
used in generative models for generating images from low-
dimensional latent codes. We use other standard components
like ReLU activation, batch normalization and ResNet style of
performing additive skip connections. Input to this testbed is
the intermediate activations, zl from any arbitrary layer l of the
target model and output is the image generated xˆ. We first train
two separate ResNet-18 architectures on datasets for image
classification with NoPeek and without NoPeek for baseline
comparison. After the training, we use held-out validation set
to generate intermediate activations. We thereby generate a
paired dataset of activations and corresponding images. We use
this paired dataset to train the reconstruction testbed to emulate
the attacker. We use 90% of the original validation dataset as
training dataset for the reconstruction testbed and remaining
10% is used as test-set for the qualitative evaluation of the
reconstruction quality. We train the model in the reconstruction
testbed on a dataset of zl, x pairs with the loss function as
the euclidean norm between x and xˆ. We want to emphasize
that there can be a potentially better design for architectures
of the reconstruction testbed and better loss functions but the
goal of this paper is to just have a fair comparison between
the NoPeek based training and the regular training of deep
networks using a reasonable reconstruction architecture. The
number of upsampling layers in the architecture of the testbed
Fig. 6: Reconstruction results for CIFAR10. The top row
is the original image and the second row is reconstruction
from activations of the network trained on CIFAR10. In the
third row, activations are presented from network trained with
NoPeek method. Even though the images are part of the train-
ing dataset, the network present in reconstruction is not able
to generate any meaningful or discriminative representation
when activations come from the network trained with NoPeek.
The testbed fails to reconstruct the activations perfectly for the
baseline as well especially because the activations belong to
last layer.
vary depending upon the difference in the dimensionality of
zl and x.
For all of our reported experiments for training the network,
we use Adam optimizer with initial learning rate as 1 × e−3
with exponential decay. The experiments are further detailed
below.
A. CIFAR10
We use CIFAR10 for our inversion experiments with respect
to vision model trained for image classification task. We first
train the network on 50,000 training samples of CIFAR10
with and without NoPeek and then use 10,000 validation data
samples and their corresponding activation as the dataset for
the inversion attack model. We choose one of the middle
layers of ResNet-18, that is positioned at second stage and
first residual block in the network. We train the ResNet-18
with both regular training (baseline) and NoPeek approaches.
We then use this layer’s activations on the validation as the
input dataset for training the reconstruction testbed. The result
is shown in the Figure 6. The low resolution of images in
the CIFAR10 dataset makes it difficult to report the results
experimentally. However, degradation in the reconstruction
quality is clearly evident in the Figure 6.
B. UTKFace
UTKFace is a database of human faces. We train a ResNet
based branched network which learns to predict the age, race,
and gender of the person. The initial part of the network is
common for all three prediction branches and splits near the
end of the network with dense layers. We use ResNet-18 for
the common part of the architecture and choose the last ResNet
block of the output of second stage to be decorrelated with the
input for testing the NoPeek approach.
Fig. 7: average `2 norm between the image reconstructed by
reconstruction testbed and original image in UTKFace dataset.
Changing α results in different levels of the difference in the
. `2 loss between the two images is not the ideal metric as
it does not handle the semantic features present in the image.
For the qualitative results please see Figure 8.
Fig. 8: Privacy-utility tradeoff on UTK: We show l2 error
of reconstruction of a baseline strategy of adding uniform
noise (in red) to activations of the layer being protected. This
results in a model of no classififcation utility (performs at
chance accuracy) albeit while preventing reconstruction. Our
NoPeek approach (in blue) attains a much greater classfication
accuracy for the downstream task ( 0.82) compared to adding
uniform noise ( chance accuracy) while still preventing recon-
struction of raw data. This is compared to regular training,
that does not prevent the reconstruction (in green).
Figure 9 shows the qualitative result of our experiment on
the face attribute prediction. We observe majority of the faces
to be unidentifiable from the reconstruction.
In general, we observe the reconstructions learned by the
testbed trained on NoPeek activations tend to be relatively
similar towards average face image of this dataset. For quan-
titative comparison, we plot the average l2 reconstruction error
for the entire test dataset in Figure 7. In Figure 8. we show
the privacy-utility tradeoff with respect to a baseline of adding
uniform noise, NoPeek and conventional training.
C. Diabetic Retinopathy
Privacy is a well known concern in the medical community
hence, we experiment NoPeek approach for training network
on the task of Diabetic retinopathy severity detection method.
Previous research [61] has shown it is possible to predict
personal attributes of a person like gender, smoking habits
etc. from fundus images. In our experiment, we train a CNN
Fig. 9: We use the reconstruction testbed to generate faces
from the activations of a given intermediate layer. Here, first
row is the actual image, second row is reconstruction from the
activations and third row is reconstruction when the network is
trained with NoPeek. NoPeek training makes it difficult for the
adversary to generate the actual image from the activations.
Fig. 10: Reconstruction results for fundus images with first
row being the original image, second row as reconstruction
from regular training and third is the result of reconstruction
from NoPeek. The finer level granularity of vessels and dark
spots is lost in both images but the no-peek approach loses it
even more making better for privacy of attributes which can
be inferred from these finer level details which is needed for
diagnosis or biometric applications.
model to predict diabetic retinopathy severity from the fundus
images. We use standard ResNet-18 for training the main
model and partition the activations in the middle of the layers.
We downsample the fundus images to standardize them to a
common size of 64×64. Hence, the task for the reconstruction
testbed is to generate 64×64 fundus image given the interme-
diate activations. Figure 10 shows qualitative results for some
of the samples, it can be noted that the images generated by the
testbed do not reconstruct attribute discriminative features such
as blood vessels successfuly and the loss of such discriminative
features is higher for the NoPeek method.
D. Attribute Privacy
As described mathematically in the section 4.2, we also
extend the NoPeek approach to minimize distance correlation
between the intermediate activations and a particular chosen
attribute with respect to which we want to attain privacy. We
use UTK Face dataset under the same setting as described in
the section 7.2, but this time instead of training the method on
all three attributes - age, gender, and race, we only train on
the two attributes at a time while treating the other attribute as
Fig. 11: Distance correlation value as the network gets trained
on the UTK face dataset. Note that the network by itself
reduces distance correlation even in the baseline experiment.
a protected class and hence, distance correlation is minimized
between the intermediate activations and the corresponding
attribute. We do not treat gender as a protected attribute since
Fig. 12: We extend the NoPeek approach to decorrelate the
activations with respect to a particular attribute. In this figure,
we decorrelate the intermediate activations with the attribute
(race) we want to protect from leaking during inference.
Usually, the information leakage is still very high in the
activations upon applying only a single layer of convolution
filters, yet, we can see here that the NoPeek approach makes
it difficult for the adversary to reconstruct the persons image.
it is a binary class in our dataset. Figure 12 shows the recon-
struction results when NoPeek approach is used for attribute
level privacy. The more compelling part of this experiment
is that the reconstruction testbed is never supervised about
the image’s attributes itself, it is just designed to generate the
image showing that attribute level privacy technique is indeed
capturing related attributes and invariances.
E. Visualizing activations
We visualize the activations of the filters in early layers
to see the resulting effect of minimizing the distance corre-
lation between activations and raw data. Figure 14 shows the
decreasing levels of leakage.
For this experiment, we treat the target z for NoPeek as
the output of first CNN layer itself which we restrict to
only three output channels so as to visualize only the RGB
component. Figure 15 shows the output of first layer of the
trained network. The joint minimization of distance correlation
with cross entropy(in classification task) leads to a different
set of feature extraction or transformation over features in such
a way that it is perceivable for human visual system as well.
Fig. 13: By introducing NoPeek in the training of the network,
we obtain a major decrease in the distance correlation from
0.6 (baseline) to 0.22 (NoPeek) while the decrease in the
accuracies is relatively much lesser.
Fig. 14: We see decreasing levels of leakage of information
about raw data in the activations as the weight of distance
correlation term in the weighted loss function is increased sig-
nificantly over a colorectal histology medical dataset available
publicly.
Fig. 15: Visualization of
the activations of the first
layer of a ResNet. In the
activation maps of the first
layer in the second row,
subtle facial features can
be observed from the acti-
vations about the raw im-
age while, in the third row,
the NoPeek method forces
the network to decorrelate
the features with respect to
raw data, hence making it
hard to interpret.
We also visualize activations ob-
tained on colorectal histology
dataset with increasing values of
α in 14.
V. DISCUSSION
One of the important aspects
of proposed technique is to
jointly optimize for distance cor-
relation and task related loss
function like cross entropy for
classification. In other words,
we are optimizing for the trade-
off between privacy and util-
ity by controlling α1 and α2
as described previously. Fig-
ure 7 shows three variations of
this trade-off , where Without
NoPeek approach is essentially
α1 = 0. In order to understand
it well, in Figure 11 we plot the
distance correlation of a fixed
intermediate activation as during
training for a NoPeek network
as well as for a network without NoPeek. This demonstrates
that the network without NoPeek also reduces the distance
correlation beyond a certain layer and our proposed method
can be seen as an additional regularizer which forces the
network to regularize for the reduction in distance correlation
at a much higher rate between raw data and the activations.
In Figure 13 we observe that accuracy dropped by a relatively
small amount compared to the drop in distance correlation and
this relative difference between the drop can be controlled
through tuning the α for the distance correlation as well as
cross entropy. The choice of α is also dictated by the position
of the intermediate activation in the network as well as the type
of layer which produces the output. For example, compared
to convolution layers, which imposes heavy prior on images,
a fully connected layer can learn to attain a lesser distance
correlation relatively easy and hence should also guide the
choice of α.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed NoPeek schemes based on distance correla-
tion seem to have versatile applicability in the space of privacy,
computer vision and machine learning given that it does not
require major changes in the model setup and architectures
except for the proposed modification to loss function.It would
be great to realize on-device implementations of the universal
decorrelation and other NoPeek schemes. With regards to
human visual perception of bias and privacy, we would also
like to conduct a large-scale crowdsourced survey to compare
performance of human participants in deciphering the true
sensitive attribute upon looking at NoPeek results in terms
of their proximity to a uniform random prediction.
APPENDIX
Distance correlation between centered data can be repre-
sented as Tr (X
TXZTZ)√
Tr (XTX)2 Tr (ZTZ)2
[50]. Distance covariance in
the numerator can be written as
Tr(XTZX) =
∑
ij
〈zi, zj〉(‖xi − xj‖)2 (2)
This can be written in matrix form using basis vectors ei, ej
as ∑
ij
[Tr (ZTeie
T
j Z)Tr(X
T(ei − ej)(ei − ej)TX)] (3)
Simplifying the notation with Mij = eieTj and Aij = (ei −
ej)(ei − ej)T we have
∂Tr(ZTLZZ)
∂Z
=
∑
ij
(2MijZ)Tr(X
TAijX)
On the lines of 3, we have Tr(ZTLZZ) =∑
ij [Tr(Z
TMijZ)Tr(Z
TAijZ)] Therefore utilizing these
identities, the derivative of squared distance correlation w.r.t
Z can be written as
cxTr(Z
TLZZ)
∂Tr(XTLZX)
∂Z − [Tr(XTLZX)]2cx ∂Tr(Z
TLZZ)
∂Z
[Tr(ZTLZZ)]2
(4)
A. B: Deep-learning friendly source code for sample distance
correlation
def p a i r w i s e d i s t (A ) :
r = t f . reduce sum (A∗A, 1)
r = t f . r e s h a p e ( r , [−1 , 1 ] )
D = t f . maximum ( r − 2∗ t f . matmul (A, t f . t r a n s p o s e (A) ) + t f . t r a n s p o s e ( r ) , 1e−7)
D = t f . s q r t (D)
re turn D
def d i s t c o r r (X, Y ) :
n = t f . c a s t ( t f . shape (X) [ 0 ] , t f . f l o a t 3 2 )
a = p a i r w i s e d i s t (X)
b = p a i r w i s e d i s t (Y)
A = a − t f . reduce mean ( a , a x i s =1) −\
t f . expand dims ( t f . reduce mean ( a , a x i s =0 ) , a x i s =1)+\
t f . reduce mean ( a )
B = b − t f . reduce mean ( b , a x i s =1) −\
t f . expand dims ( t f . reduce mean ( b , a x i s =0 ) , a x i s =1)+\
t f . reduce mean ( b )
dCovXY = t f . s q r t ( t f . reduce sum (A∗B) / ( n ∗∗ 2 ) )
dVarXX = t f . s q r t ( t f . reduce sum (A∗A) / ( n ∗∗ 2 ) )
dVarYY = t f . s q r t ( t f . reduce sum (B∗B) / ( n ∗∗ 2 ) )
dCorXY = dCovXY / t f . s q r t ( dVarXX ∗ dVarYY )
re turn dCorXY
B. Code/Reproducibility
The code for our method is provided in this anony-
mous code repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/
820473f8-f3ee-4212-9b9c-409a78722af6/.
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